TL;DR

Many advanced and emerging economies are now experiencing natural population decline, where deaths exceed births, driven by sustained below-replacement fertility and population aging. While immigration has offset these declines in some countries, demographic momentum points to long-term economic, fiscal and labour market challenges that policy interventions have so far struggled to reverse.

In 2025, France recorded more deaths than births for the first time since the end of the Second World War, crossing a demographic threshold that marks a shift in the country’s population dynamics. According to data released by INSEE (Institut National de la Statistique et des Études Économiques), France recorded 645,000 births and 651,000 deaths in 2025, resulting in a negative natural balance of 6,000.

Despite this milestone, France’s total population continued to grow modestly. As of Jan. 1, 2026, France’s population stood at 69.1 million, a 0.25 per cent increase from the previous year. This growth was driven entirely by net migration, provisionally estimated at 176,000 people. France’s total fertility rate in 2025 was 1.56 children per woman, the lowest level since the end of the First World War and well below the replacement level, commonly estimated at about 2.1 children per woman in high-income countries.

Understanding Natural Population Decline

Natural population decline occurs when the number of deaths in a country exceeds the number of births within a given period, typically measured annually. This differs from overall population decline, which accounts for migration. A country can experience natural decline while its total population increases if immigration exceeds the natural decrease, as is currently the case in France.

Replacement-level fertility, typically approximated at 2.1 children per woman in high-income countries, refers to the fertility rate needed for a population to replace itself from one generation to the next without migration. When fertility rates remain below this threshold for extended periods, natural population decline becomes more likely as smaller birth cohorts enter reproductive age while larger cohorts reach the end of life expectancy.

Germany: Five Decades of Natural Decline

Germany provides one of the longest-running examples of sustained natural population decline among major economies. Germany first experienced more deaths than births in 1972, making 2024 the 53rd consecutive year of natural decline. Research published by Germany’s Federal Statistical Office (Destatis) shows that Germany’s birth deficit has been consistently offset by net migration in most years, allowing the country’s total population to remain relatively stable despite more than five decades of natural decrease.

Demographic projections from Destatis indicate that Germany will face acute labour market challenges as its population ages, with the working-age population expected to decline substantially in coming decades even with continued immigration.

United States: Approaching the Threshold

The Congressional Budget Office’s January 2026 demographic outlook projects that the United States will reach natural population decline around 2030, when annual deaths are expected to exceed annual births.

This projection reflects declining total fertility rates, projected to fall to 1.53 births per woman by the mid-2030s, combined with an aging population. The U.S. total fertility rate has been below replacement level since 2008, falling from 2.12 in 2007 to 1.59 in 2024.

Without immigration, the CBO projects the U.S. population would begin shrinking in 2030. Under current projections, net immigration is expected to account for all U.S. population growth after 2030, as natural increase turns negative.

China’s Demographic Trajectory

China officially entered natural population decline in 2022, when the country recorded 9.56 million births and 10.41 million deaths. This marked the first year of population decline since the early 1960s famine period. In 2023, births fell further to 9.02 million, with 11.1 million deaths, accelerating the decline.

The trend continued in 2025, when China reported 7.92 million births and 11.31 million deaths. China’s population decreased by 3.39 million in 2025, a 17 per cent year-over-year decline in births and the steepest annual population decrease in recent decades.

Unlike the population decline during China’s 1959-61 famine period, which reflected excess mortality, the current demographic transition reflects sustained fertility decline and increasing longevity, driven by long-term social and economic factors.

Estimates commonly place China’s total fertility rate at about 1.0 births per woman in 2023 and 2024, though methods vary. The combination of decades of low fertility and rapid population aging is widely expected to create economic challenges for China in the coming decades.

Thailand’s Recent Transition

Thailand has experienced natural population decline since 2021, marking four consecutive years of this demographic pattern as of 2024. In 2024, Thailand recorded 462,240 births and 571,646 deaths. Recent estimates indicate Thailand’s total fertility rate fell to about 1.21 in 2023, well below replacement level.

Other Countries in Natural Decline

Based on provisional 2024 vital statistics compiled by national statistical agencies, several countries and territories recorded more deaths than births in 2024, including Japan, Italy, Germany, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, Ukraine, Russia, South Korea, Taiwan, Cuba and Puerto Rico.

This list reflects a concentration in Europe and East Asia, where demographic transition occurred earlier and fertility has remained below replacement level for extended periods.

Age Structure and Economic Activity

Population age structure has measurable effects on economic activity patterns. Research from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, using the Consumer Expenditure Survey, shows that average annual expenditures peak at ages 35 to 44 ($20,619 in 2013 dollars), then decline with age. As populations age, spending patterns shift, including higher healthcare spending and lower spending in discretionary categories.

Studies examining retirement economics have found that consumption typically falls 12 to 20 per cent after retirement, reflecting reduced income and changing needs. This shift can affect aggregate demand in economies with aging populations.

Analysis of 87 countries from 1996 to 2017, published in peer-reviewed literature, found that population aging is associated with higher government spending in developed countries, particularly on healthcare and pension systems, and can coincide with weaker revenue growth as the working-age share of the population declines. These pressures intensify as dependency ratios increase — the share of the population outside working age (typically 15 to 64) relative to those within it.

International Trade and Demographic Structure

Research published in the Journal of International Economics examining bilateral trade patterns across 86 industries from 1962 to 2010 found that demographic differences between trading partners are associated with comparative advantage. Countries with different age structures tend to specialize in different types of production, with younger-skewing populations more competitive in labour-intensive manufacturing while aging populations shift toward more capital-intensive and knowledge-based industries.

A 2023 study in the Journal of Economic Studies found that relative age structure between trading partners is associated with differences in bilateral trade composition. As populations age at different rates globally, these demographic differences can reshape trade relationships.

Work published in The World Economy suggests that demographic differences can influence capital flows and interest rates. Some research indicates that capital may tend to flow from older to younger economies when younger populations offer stronger growth prospects. As fertility rates decline across more regions, the set of faster-growing, younger economies may shrink, potentially reducing these demographic-driven differences.

Latin America’s Demographic Transition

According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Latin American and Caribbean region is projected to reach peak population around 2058 before beginning to decline. The regional fertility rate has fallen below replacement level and continues to decline.

While the region’s total population is projected to increase for several decades due to population momentum — the effect of earlier, larger birth cohorts moving through their reproductive years — natural increase is expected to slow, and some countries are projected to enter natural decline over time.

Chile

Recent estimates place Chile’s total fertility rate at about 1.1 to 1.2 children per woman. Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas projects that population growth will slow substantially and that the population may stabilize and begin to decline in coming decades as the effects of sustained below-replacement fertility compound.

Chile’s trajectory reflects a pattern seen in parts of Latin America: rapid fertility decline alongside urbanization and rising educational attainment, leading to population aging and, in some cases, eventual natural population decline.

Colombia

Colombia’s national statistics agency (DANE) reported 510,357 births in 2023, a substantial decline over the past decade. Recent estimates place Colombia’s total fertility rate at about 1.6 children per woman in 2023, below replacement level.

Demographic projections suggest Colombia’s population will continue growing until mid-century, reaching an estimated 56.9 million by 2050, before beginning to decline as natural increase turns negative. As of the most recent data, Colombia’s working-age population (typically 15 to 64) represents about 69.8 per cent of the total population, consistent with a late-stage demographic transition marked by low birth and death rates and a rising median age.

Workforce and Dependency Ratios

National Bureau of Economic Research working papers analysing demographic data from 1950 to 2015 across multiple countries have found that declining working-age population shares are associated with slower economic growth, though the magnitude varies based on productivity growth, capital accumulation and institutional factors.

In Germany, the old-age dependency ratio — the number of people aged 65 and over relative to the working-age population — has increased substantially since 1972, increasing fiscal pressure on pension and healthcare systems. Similar patterns are emerging across other countries experiencing prolonged natural decline.

Technology and Export Capacity

A 2024 study published in Technological Forecasting and Social Change examining 171 countries from 2000 to 2019 found that a one per cent increase in population aging is associated with a 0.5 to 1.1 per cent reduction in high-technology exports. The study suggests demographic structure can affect innovation and export competitiveness, potentially through workforce composition, innovation capacity and adoption of new technologies.

Current Fertility Rates: Comparative Data

Recent data from national statistical agencies and international sources show the following total fertility rates:

  • South Korea: 0.72 (2023)
  • Taiwan: 0.85 (2023)
  • China: about 1.0 (2023-24)
  • Thailand: 1.21 (2023)
  • Spain: 1.16 (2022)
  • Italy: 1.20 (2023)
  • Japan: 1.2 (2023)
  • Germany: 1.35 (2023)
  • France: 1.56 (2025)
  • United States: 1.59 (2024)
  • Colombia: 1.6 (2023)
  • New Zealand: 1.53 (2024)

All of these rates fall below the replacement level, commonly estimated at about 2.1 children per woman in high-income countries. If current fertility patterns persist, each of these countries is likely to experience natural population decline over time, unless offset by net migration.

Immigration’s Role

For many developed countries, immigration has become the primary source of population growth. France’s 2025 population increase of 0.25 per cent came entirely from net migration. Germany’s population has remained relatively stable despite 53 consecutive years of natural decline due to positive net migration in most years. The United States’ projected natural decline after 2030 is expected to be more than offset by immigration under current CBO assumptions, allowing continued population growth.

However, immigration patterns are subject to policy changes, economic conditions and geopolitical factors, making them less predictable than demographic trends driven by fertility and mortality. Countries facing labour shortages due to population aging may increasingly compete for immigrants, particularly skilled workers, shaping new dynamics in international migration.

Policy Responses and Their Limitations

Governments facing fertility decline have implemented a range of interventions with limited success in reversing trends. Public estimates suggest South Korea has spent hundreds of billions of dollars since 2006 on childcare subsidies, housing support and parental leave, yet fertility fell from 1.24 to 0.72 during that period. France, with relatively higher European fertility at 1.56, maintains extensive supports, including childcare programs, parental leave and tax measures, though these policies have not restored replacement-level fertility.

Immigration has emerged as the primary policy tool for offsetting natural decline, with Canada, Australia and Germany increasing intake targets. However, immigration faces political constraints and does not address underlying fertility trends.

Some research suggests that once fertility falls below 1.5, recovery can become more difficult, with cultural and structural factors reinforcing lower birth rates. Countries have not yet demonstrated a broadly reproducible path to sustained fertility recovery after prolonged, deep below-replacement fertility.

Measurement and Projection Methods

Population projections are based on assumptions about future fertility, mortality and migration that may not materialize. Projection accuracy declines with time horizon, with near-term estimates (2026 to 2035) generally more reliable than longer-range projections beyond 2040. The CBO’s revision of its U.S. natural decline timeline from the early-to-mid 2030s to 2030 illustrates how demographic forecasts can change with new data and revised methods.

Fertility rates are typically measured as period total fertility rates (TFR), which estimate the number of children a woman would have if she experienced current age-specific fertility rates throughout her reproductive years. This measure can be affected by timing effects. When women delay childbearing, period TFRs may temporarily fall even if completed cohort fertility remains stable.

Natural population change is measured by subtracting deaths from births in a given period, while total population change also accounts for net migration (immigration minus emigration). Some countries provide provisional estimates that are later revised as more complete data becomes available, requiring careful attention to data status when comparing across countries or time.

Long-term Implications

The demographic patterns described in this analysis reflect measurable shifts in births and deaths across multiple countries and regions. The long-term economic and social implications of sustained natural population decline remain subjects of ongoing research and debate.

Fiscal sustainability concerns centre on funding pension and healthcare systems with shrinking working-age populations and growing numbers of retirees. Rising dependency ratios in countries such as Germany and Japan place upward pressure on public spending while potentially constraining revenue growth.

Labour force implications extend beyond headcount reductions. Productivity gains from automation and capital deepening may partially offset workforce declines, though the extent of these effects remains uncertain. Some research suggests labour scarcity can encourage innovation and investment, while other evidence points to constraints on growth from a smaller workforce.

Technology and automation present both opportunities and challenges. Robotics and artificial intelligence could support productivity with fewer workers, but implementation requires substantial investment and may not fully compensate for demographic change. Japan’s experience with robotics integration in elder care and manufacturing provides some evidence of adaptation, though comprehensive assessment remains ongoing.

Research from the National Bureau of Economic Research indicates that perspectives on population decline’s economic impact range from predictions of significant challenges to more modest effects, depending on assumptions about technological progress, policy responses and economic adaptation.

Methodological Note

Population projections are inherently uncertain and depend on assumptions about future fertility, mortality and migration that may not materialize. The projections cited here reflect mid-range scenarios from various modelling approaches. Actual outcomes may differ substantially.

The data presented reflect the most recent releases available as of mid-January 2026. Several values, particularly migration estimates and recent-year vital statistics, are provisional and may be revised as more complete data becomes available. Cross-country fertility and population metrics are not perfectly comparable across national statistical systems, and interpretations should account for definitional and methodological differences.

Data Sources

This analysis draws on data from national statistical institutes, including INSEE (France), Destatis (Germany), the U.S. Census Bureau and Congressional Budget Office, China’s National Bureau of Statistics, Thailand’s Department of Provincial Administration, Chile’s Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, Colombia’s DANE, and statistical agencies from other referenced countries.

Additional sources include the United Nations Population Division, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, academic research published in the Journal of International Economics, the Journal of Economic Studies, The World Economy and Technological Forecasting and Social Change, and National Bureau of Economic Research working papers.

Fertility data and demographic indicators are also drawn from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators database and compiled demographic datasets that harmonize national statistics for cross-country comparison.

Ethics Statement

This analysis is intended to support informed public discussion. It aims to describe demographic and economic research accurately, avoid sensationalism, and distinguish clearly between observed data, projections and interpretation. Where uncertainty exists, it is explicitly acknowledged. The article does not advocate for policies that target individuals’ reproductive decisions and does not attribute demographic outcomes to any protected group.

Disclaimer

This article is provided for general information and discussion purposes only. It is not legal, financial, investment or policy advice, and it should not be relied upon as such. Demographic projections and estimates are subject to revision as new data emerge and as statistical agencies update methodologies. Any errors or omissions are unintentional.

The views expressed are my own and are offered solely in my personal capacity. They do not represent the views of my employer, any current or former affiliated organizations, clients, partners or any other related entities.

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